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This study attempts to identify factors responsible for determining differences in the
productivity of cattle managed by communal and private livestock farmers in the
southern region of Botswana during 1999/2000. It is hypothesised that herd
productivity and investment in southern Botswana are higher on private ranches than
on open access communal grazing land.
This study is important because livestock, especially cattle, contribute significantly to
the livelihood of farmers in Botswana. Cattle are a major source of meat, milk and
draught power, and provide a store of wealth that protects against inflation and which
can easily be converted into cash. Cattle production is also an important source of
employment in the rural economy of Botswana. Furthermore, the export of beef is a
major source of foreign exchange earnings, and cattle account for 80 percent of
agriculture's contribution to Botswana's gross domestic product.
A stratified random sample survey of communal and private livestock farmers was
conducted in the southern region of Botswana from August 1999 to May 2000 with the
assistance of four enumerators. The sample survey data were used to compute
descriptive statistics and to estimate the parameters of a block recursive regression
model. The model postulated relationships between agricultural credit, investment in
fixed improvement, investment in operating inputs and herd productivity. Some of the
equations are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and some with Two-Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) to account for likely correlation between endogenous
explanatory variables and the error term.
ii
Descriptive statistics show that levels of investment and herd productivity are higher
on private farms than on open-access communal grazing. Private farmers are also better
educated, more liquid, and have larger herd sizes, but do not differ from their
communal counterparts in terms of age, gender, race or household size. The regression
results show that (a) respondents with secure tenure and larger herds use more
agricultural credit than those who rely on open access communal grazing land to raise
cattle; (b) secure land tenure, higher levels of liquidity and use of long-term credit
promote investment in fixed improvements to land; (c) liquidity from short-term credit
and wage remittances supports expenditure on operating inputs; and (d) herd
productivity increases with greater investment in fixed improvement and operating
inputs. Herd productivity is therefore positively (but indirectly) influenced by secure
land tenure.
It can therefore be inferred that government should (a) uphold private property rights to
land where they already exists; (b) privatise open access grazing to individual owner-
operators where this is politically, socially, and economically feasible; and (c) where
privatisation to individuals is not feasible, government should encourage users to
convert the grazing into common property by subsidising the costs of defining user
groups and the boundaries of their resources, and enforcing rules limiting individual
use of common property. This first-step in a gradual shift towards more secure tenure
should be followed by the conversion of user groups to non-user groups organized
along the lines of investor-owned firms where members exchange use rights for benefit
and voting rights in a joint venture managed by an expert.
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" Wa e tlhoka wa tlhoka boroko, wa nna nayo wa nna wa bo tlhoka" is a Setswana proverb
claiming that a farmer who does not have cattle faces problems such as lack of wealth and
income; but when he or she does own cattle, problems of managing them prevail. This
summarises the dilemma of cattle ownership in most African countries.
Livestock, especially cattle, make a significant contribution to the livelihood of rural
households in Botswana. Cattle are an important source of food and employment creation.
The Bank of Botswana (1999: 68) attributes about 16 percent of rural employment in
1999/2000 to the agriculture sector but slowed down to 13.4 percent in 2002 (Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning, 2003). Over 80 percent of the 1.7 million people in
Botswana reside in rural areas and strive to earn a living directly or indirectly from
agriculture, and the majority of them raise cattle (Behnke, 1985; Malope, 1999; Ministry of
Agriculture, 1989). Cattle generate a large share of rural household income (Fidzani,
1993), provide milk during the rainy season and meat as a source of protein during the dry
season. Rural households in Botswana use ox-drawn ploughs to cultivate extensive areas of
arable land. Therefore cattle provide an important link with arable production. Other cattle
products used by rural households in Botswana include hides for mats and leather ropes.
Importantly, cattle reproduce and provide a store of wealth (Crotty, 1980: 46; Hubbard,
1986: 31; Ministry of Agriculture, 1996) that protects against inflation and which can
easily be converted into cash (liquidated) in times of need (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991).
For example, cattle are often sold to finance dowry (bogadi), funeral expenses and school
fees (Fidzani, 1993). Cattle perform the function ofa 'bank' in rural areas in Botswana.
Beef cattle contribute significantly to the foreign exchange earned by the agriculture sector
in Botswana because arable agriculture is severely constrained by erratic and unreliable
rainfall (Behnke, 1987; Ministry of Agriculture, 1991; Panin et al., 1993; Abel, 1997;
Panin & Mahabile, 1997; Mahabile et al., 2002). At macroeconomic level, cattle account
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for about three percent of Botswana's gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 percent of
agriculture's share of the GDP (Central Statistics Office, 1995; Ministry of Agriculture,
1996). The contribution of agriculture, mining and manufacturing to GDP from 1966 to
2003 is presented in Figure 1.1. The contribution of the agriculture sector declined sharply
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Figure 1.1: Percentage contribution of selected sectors to Botswana'sgross domestic product
Source: Adapted from Central Statistics Office, 1995 and Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, 2003.
The mining industry however increased its contribution to GDP from zero percent in 1966
to about 33 percent in 2001/2003. The increase in the contribution of mining was due to
the discovery of diamonds, copper and nickel in the early 1970's. The development of the
mining sector has been a major source of Botswana's economic growth and development.
Agriculture is expected to add 0.8 percent to real annual growth in Botswana's GDP
whereas the mining sector is expected to contribute 5.8 percent (Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, 2003). Growth in these sectors has increased the country's real
economic growth rate to 6.4 percent per annum from 1997 to 2003 (Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning, 2003). The occurrence of drought caused high cattle
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mortalities, which constrained agriculture's contribution to GDP in 2000 and 2003. GDP
computation does not include, at the farm level, the value of products such as manure,
hides and skins that the cattle sector contributes to the rural sector. This measure of
agriculture's performance is therefore understated (Abel, 1997).
Despite its current dominance, the mining sector does not generate significant employment
because it is highly capital intensive. Agriculture, on the other hand, with its relatively
small share of Botswana's GDP, has strong linkages to the rest of the economy (Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning, 1997: 227), the most important of which is
employment creation particularly livestock production. Although cattle ownership is
highly skcwed (section 1.5), it is the only sector where the majority of farmers are
Batswana' (Ministry ofAgriculture, 1996).
1.2 LAND RIGHTS AND USE OF GRAZING RESOURCES IN BOTSWANA
Botswana's grazing land is characterised by open access or common property conditions in
the communal areas, private property in the country's freehold and leasehold areas, and
zones reserved mainly for wildlife and tourism (Lawry, 1983). The communal grazing area
accounts for 86 percent of Botswana's cattle population and 71 percent of its rural area.
This land is officially owned and administered by statutory Land Boards, and its grazing is
mostly an open access resource. Open access implies that rules limiting individual use of
communal land are either missing or are not enforced. Common property implies that users
make and enforce such rules. The less stringent are these rules, or the more lax is their
enforcement, the more similar are the economic outcomes of open access and common
property regimes. In Botswana, common property is usually associated with "syndicate"
farms, which account for a very small share (less than one percent) of the country's
communal grazing land (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991). Sections 2.1 and 2.2 explain why
property rights to communal grazing land are not secure in the economic sense.
Private ranches account for only a small fraction (14 percent) of the national herd and a
smaller share (five percent) of the land (Ministry ofAgriculture, 1991). Private farms refer
to farms where the operators have exclusive and marketable property rights to land.
1 People of Botswana are called Batswana .
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Freehold farms were acquired during the colonial era. Leasehold farms were allocated to
their "owners" by the Land Boards. For the purpose of this study, leasehold farms are
regarded as privately-owned ranches (even though their "owners" do not possess freehold
title to the land) because their lease is long-term (50 years renewable), fully transferable,
can be sold or pledged as collateral, permits subletting and assigns exclusive rights to an
individual holder. In short, private ranches, both freehold and leasehold, are characterised
by secure land tenure. Private farmers often rest their own grazing land by driving their
cattle into communal areas for part of the year (usually during the spring months).
Although the Ministry of Agriculture specifies maximum stocking rates for all types of
land, these limitations are not easily enforced by Land Boards (Carl Bro International,
1982). Water rights assigned to farmers in communal areas do not impose any quantitative
restriction on the volume of water used or the number of animals kept (stocking rate) by
stockowners (Carl Bro International, 1982). National parks and game reserves, which are
on state land managed by the Ministry of Wild life and Tourism, make up the remaining 24
percent ofthe grazing area.
1.3 BOTSWANA'S BEEF TRADE AND EXPORTS
1.3.1 Internal Marketing System
There are three types of slaughtering facilities in the livestock marketing chain in
Botswana. The Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) is a monopolistic state enterprise with
two operating abattoirs; one at Lobatse established in 1954 and the other at Francistown,
which was opened in 1989. These two abattoirs are European Union (EU) export approved
and therefore maintain high standards of hygiene and quality control supervised by the
Government Department ofAnimal Health and Production.
Council abattoirs are the second slaughtering facility. These abattoirs provide a slaughter
service to local butchers. There are currently a total of six council abattoirs located in each
of the Gaborone, Francistown, Lobatse, Jwaneng, Selibe Phikwe and Serowe. Employees
of the local council carry out meat inspection and general hygiene and quality control.
Some council abattoirs have been found to be inadequate. In 2003, for example, it was
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recommended that the Gaborone Council abattoir should be closed for serious renovation.
Private butcheries are found in some of the smaller urban centres where there are no
council abattoirs. Most of these facilities consist of slaughtering slabs or a simple
slaughterhouse, which are often sub-standard (Ministry of Agriculture, 1996). Some
slaughtering occurs on farms and at cattle posts' and the meat is subsequently sold at a
local butchery.
The Botswana Meat Commission slaughters an average of 114,000 cattle per annum while
municipal abattoirs and local butcheries slaughter 67 000 and 50 000 cattle per annum
respectively (Central Statistics Office, 2002). The Central Statistics Office (CSO) (1995)
reports that 124000 cattle were slaughtered annually for home consumption from 1992 to
1994, while the Ministry of Agriculture (1996) reports about 120 000 cattle per annum
slaughtered for home consumption during the same period.
1.3.2 External Beef Trade
Botswana's economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade. The beef industry accounted
for about 20 percent of Botswana's exports in 1999/2000 and remains the country's largest
contributor to agricultural exports. Exports ofmeat and its products are expected to grow at
6.8 per cent after a reduction in 2000 due to drought and diseases (Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, 2003). According to the External Trade Statistics Digest (2001),
p
3240
million was earned through the sale of beef in 2000.
The Cotonou Agreement offers Botswana and other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries reduced import tariffs in the beef trade, and a specified quota to the ED.
Botswana has, however, managed to supply only 70 percent of its quota (Ministry of
Agriculture, 1996). Meat and meat products, as shown in Figure 1.2, are the major export
earners followed by hides and skins.
2 Cattle posts are places where communal farmers keep their livestock .
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Figure 1.2: Real export earnings ofBotswana's livestock and its products (2000 =100)
Source: Central Statistics office, 2003.
Trade in live cattle (measured on the second vertical axis) contributed the least to export
earnings from 1980 to 2002. Exports of beef are mainly to the (EU), North America, Japan
and South Africa (SA). A closer examination of Figure 1.2 reveals that the value of beef
exports has been increasing steadily since 1980. There was, however a significant drop in
beef exports during 2002-2003. This was caused by, inter alia, the outbreak of foot and
mouth disease in the north of the country. The BMC had to close its abattoir in
Francistown for a considerable time in order to control the spread of the disease. Beefs
contribution to agricultural exports is expected to grow as long as Botswana continues to
benefit from protocols such as the Cotonou Agreement and observes EU Trade
requirements.
Botswana has invested large sums ofmoney in the Livestock Identification and Trace Back
System (LITS). The objective of this project is to be able to identify where cattle originate
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from for purposes of controlling diseases. This is one of the EU requirements. Cattle are
identified by insertion through the mouth, boluses", which are bar coded with detailed
information about the farmer (Ministry ofFinance and Development Planning, 2003).
The introduction of the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) by the United
States of America (USA) Congress in 2000 is expected to further expand economic
opportunities and cooperation for Botswana to export beef, its by products and raw
material such as leather for shoes and blood for shoe polish. The AGOA allows duty and
quota free access for most of the products (including beet) from sub-Saharan countries to
the USA.
1.4 CATTLE POPULATION
The cattle population in Botswana has followed an upward trend since the eradication of
the rinderpest disease in the 1960's. Cattle numbers reached the one million mark in the
early 1950's and thereafter two million in the 1970's (Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 73). Growth
in the national herd was caused in part by investment in water resources, particularly
boreholes, and the establishment of a government department in 1905 to control animal
diseases. Cordon fences were constructed to control the spread of diseases such as foot and
mouth. Cattle were not allowed to pass from one cordon zone to another without being
quarantined. The suitability of Botswana 's range and climate to cattle production also
contributed to the increase in cattle population. Cattle numbers, as shown in Figure 1.3,
peaked just above three million in 1991 and later declined to about 2.7 million in the late
1990's due to high mortality caused by drought, diseases and poor management (Ministry
of Agriculture, 1991).
4 A bolus is a bar coded instrument for cattle identification.
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Figure 1.3: Cattle numbers in Botswana from 1980 to 2002
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2003.
Droughts in 1980 and 1992, and frequent outbreaks ofdiseases such as foot and mouth and
lumpy skin disease (LSD) caused dramatic stock losses. The Department of Animal Health
and Production responded swiftly to disease outbreaks and managed to control them
(Colclough & McCathy, 1980: 114).
The introduction of borehole technology as a source of water supply extended grazing into
the Kgalagadi sandveld. This development significantly increased cattle numbers in areas
more susceptible to drought (Hubbard, 1986: 31). Government subsidised the cost of
constructing dip tanks (through the Service to Livestock Farmers in Communal Areas
(SLOCA) programme) and provided free vaccination for some diseases of economic
importance, such as foot and mouth disease and botulism (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991).
The Government also subsidised supplementary feeds and vitamin A during periods of
drought (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991). These subsidies reduced cattle mortalities and
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consequently increased the cattle population (Fidzani, 1993: 13). Extensive overgrazing
occurred on communal land, especially in areas around boreholes (Harvey & Lewis,
1990:73). Figure 1.3 shows that the majority (86 percent) of cattle are found in communal
areas compared to (14 percent) on private farms.
1.5 DISTRIBUTION OF CATTLE OWNERSHIP
Cattle ownership has become progressively skewed with increasing numbers (45 percent)
of rural households possessing no cattle (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980: 111-112; Picard,
1987: 233). The group that owns no cattle are generally poor, female-headed households.
Forty percent of rural households own less than 50 head each, and account for 25 percent
of the national herd. The remaining 15 percent, who are large cattle farmers, own 75
percent of the national herd (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980: 112). Chiefs and political
leaders are often amongst the largest cattle owners (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980: 112).
Before (and even after) independence, chiefs made their subjects pay levies for certain
public works such as building dams or kgotla", In some cases subjects were made to pay
the personal debts of the chief and his household (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980: 113).
Poor households had to sell cattle to meet these obligations and to pay taxes, and
consequently became poorer.
The inequitable distribution of cattle wealth has been debated for many years in Botswana.
Literature reveals that the share of cattle owned by larger farmers continued to grow during
the 1980's (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991). This trend may indicate intensification of rural
poverty if cattle ownership is used as a proxy for welfare. The mafisa system is widely
practised in Botswana; absentee farmers lend cattle to households that have few or no
livestock for caretaking. The caretaker benefits by using the cattle for draught power and
consuming milk, and is occasionally given a calf.
5 A place where tribal issues are discussed.
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1.6 VARIATION IN BOTSWANA'S CLIMATIC CONDITIONS AND HERD
SIZE
Botswana is arid and semi-arid with annual rainfall ranging from over 650 millimetres in
the extreme north east (Chobe area) to about 250 millimetres in the south west of the
Kgalagadi area (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1997: 3). There are few
occasions when rainfall exceeds these averages. There is therefore high variability of
rainfall and drought is a recurring phenomenon in Botswana. Drought adversely affects the
fragile agricultural situation in the country and negatively impacts the rural economy.
Almost all rainfall occurs in the summer months from mid-October to late April (Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning, 2003: 5). The maximum daily temperature ranges
from about 33°C in December to about noc in July. Annual evaporation rates range from
1.8 metres to over 2.5 metres annually (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning,
1997: 6). There are generally hot days and cool nights.
Rainfall is clearly an important determinant ofBotswana's herd size. The amount of forage
produced on which cattle graze is directly related to the amount and distribution of rainfall.
There are, for example, dense indigenous forests and bushes in the Chobe district where
rainfall is relatively high. More than 50 percent of the country supports shrub, tree
savannah and the mopane tree found in the North East District. In the south and west, the
land supports low shrub savannah trees. Low rainfall and poor soils favour animal
production rather than crop production. Cattle are raised in all parts of the country (even in
areas where average rainfall is less than 200 millimetres per annum). Figure lA shows the
annual rainfall from 1992 to 2003. A comparison of Figures lA and 1.3 highlights the
relationship between rainfall and livestock numbers in Botswana. Cattle numbers increased
in 2000 following good rains in 1999. However, the increase in cattle numbers occurred on
private farms and not communal grazing land. One reason for this was the outbreak of
contagious bovine pleuro-pnemonia (CBPP) in Ngamiland in 1995 where more than 300














Figure 1.4: Annual rainfall in Botswana from 1992 to 2003
Source: Central Statistics Office, 2003.
Cattle numbers are less variable on private farms than communal grazing land (Figure 1.3)
suggesting that private farmers stock cattle at lower rates, invest more in boreholes and
purchase supplementary feed. Occasional showers during the rainy season provide
sufficient grazing to maintain the herd throughout the summer season in many parts of
Botswana (Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 73). Harvey and Lewis (1990) argue that successive
years of below average rainfall can be withstood in terms of cattle numbers, even though
cattle might lose economic value due to losses in cold dress weight.
1.7 STATEMENTOFTHEPROBLEM
The livestock sector in Botswana is characterised by two distinct systems of land tenure;
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namely communal land and private land. Grazing on communal land is mostly an open
access resource that accounts for 86 percent of the cattle and 71 percent of farmers in
Botswana. Private grazing is characterised by more secure land tenure and accounts for 14
percent of the national herd and five percent of the land area (Ministry of Agriculture,
1991). There is a strong view that herd productivity in communal areas is lower than on
private ranches (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991).
As reported by Behnke (1987) and Scoones (1992), calving and off-take rates are low
amongst communal farmers. The average calving rate on private farms is about 60 percent
compared to 50 percent in communal areas (Table 1.1). Mortality rate, on the other hand, is
five percent on private farms compared to 12 percent in communal areas. Annual off-take
on private farms is 17 percent compared to just eight percent in communal areas (Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning, 2003: 181). Carcass weight for cattle sold to the
BMC is low and averages about 200 kilograms in communal areas compared to 220
kilograms on private farms (Table 1.1).
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Source: Ministryof Finance and DevelopmentPlanning,2003.
High stocking rates in the communal areas have been linked to insecure land tenure land,
degradation and a general decline in Botswana's communal herd from over 2.5 million in
the early 1980's to about 2.0 million in the 1990's (Figure 1.3). The Agricultural
Development Policy of 1991 (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991) was introduced to 'try and
encourage communal farmers to adopt new technology and reduce stocking rates. One
prominent recommendation of this policy was to convert open access grazing into common
or private property by fencing the communal areas where feasible . Commercialisation in
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communal areas is low compared to that on private farms. It is argued that herd
productivity and hence commercialisation of the livestock sector in Botswana is influenced
by many factors, especially land tenure.
Insecure land tenure and absentee farmers lead to poor farm management practices and
overstocking in communal areas (Ministry of Agriculture, 1989). Overstocking in
communal areas has resulted in overgrazing and range degradation (Gryseels, 1988:1-2;
Ministry of Agriculture, 1989). Worse still, farmers in communal areas do not invest in
improvements to the range quality because the benefits cannot be fully internalised as other
farmers (free-riders) also have access to the range (Kille & Lyne, 1993).
Researchers, however, have not adequately identified factors that contribute significantly
to herd productivity differences between farmers in communal areas and their counterparts
on private farms. Empirical identification of these factors is very important to the
implementation of the Botswana Agricultural Development Policy of 1991 on land reform.
This study aims to identify factors thought to explain differences in the productivity of
cattle managed by farmers in southern Botswana. Land tenure is just one of several
independent variables that might explain variation in herd productivity, the dependent
variable. The study was motivated by the claims of poor herd performance, especially in
herds on communal grazing land (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991; Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, 1997; Mahabile et al., 2005). The study also attempts to assess
whether government's proposed land reform has merit, and also highlights some of the
factors that constrain the implementation ofthis policy.
1.8 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The overall objective of this study is to provide decision-makers with economic insights to
factors that cause differences in herd productivity between cattle farmers in communal
areas and those on private farms in Botswana. The attainment of this objective is
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contingent upon the fulfilment ofthe following specific objectives:
1. To describe and compare the socio-economic characteristics of private and communal
cattle farmers in the study region.
2. To measure productivity indicators and investment levels of cattle farmers in southern
Botswana.
3. To empirically identify factors that explain differences in productivity of cattle
managed by private and communal farmers in southern Botswana.
4. To determine whether the policy focus on land reform of 1991 is justified and to make
policy recommendations.
This study hypothesises that investment and herd productivity are higher on private farms
than on open access communal grazing land in Botswana. The study differs from previous
studies (Ministry of Agriculture, 1989; Ministry of Agriculture, 1996) because it tries to
empirically identify factors that are responsible for differences in herd productivity
between communal farmers and private farmers. The study uses the southern region of
Botswana as a representative area of study.
1.9 PROCEDURE
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature on
determinants of herd productivity and proposes a conceptual recursive model of
determinants of herd productivity. Chapter 3 describes the sampling technique used to
gather data and presents descriptive sample statistics computed for farmer, farm household
and herd characteristics. Chapter 4 postulates and estimates the recursive model, and






Much has been written about constraints to productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of
the constraints most cited include indigenous land tenure systems, access to product and
factor markets, small farm sizes, lack of technology adoption and lack of capital
(Groenewald, 1993). Clearly these impediments are interrelated. Groenewald (1993)
argues that literature proposing that land tenure is not a constraint to agricultural
production is out-dated. Indigenous tenure systems are recognised as constraints that
provide insufficient incentive to make land improvements or to induce lenders to finance
such investments (Place & Hazell, 1993).
There is a widely-held view that the productivity of the livestock sector in Botswana is
primarily influenced by insecure land tenure (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991; Fidzani,
1993). Place et al. (1994: 19) define tenure security as a function of three components,
namely, breadth, duration and assurance of property rights, with both legal and economic
dimensions. The breadth or robustness of rights defines the legal quantity or bundle of
rights held over land (use, transfer and exclusion rights). Duration refers to the length of
time during which the bundle of rights is legally valid. An investment on the land would
require that the time period be sufficiently long to enable the land holder to recoup the full
economic returns generated by the investment (place et al., 1994: 19). Assurance defines
the certainty with which legal definitions of breadth and duration are held. Tenure is
therefore considered to be insecure if legal procedures to settle disputes are not clear or
their outcome is uncertain. Communal livestock farmers in Botswana do not have secure
tenure in the economic sense because the breadth of their land rights is constrained; they
cannot exclude other users, nor can they transact any grazing land (Mahabile et al., 2002).
A theoretical remedy to increase productivity and efficiency is to transform communal
land into individualised land rights with title-deeds that are backed by an effective legal
system (Van den Brink et al., 1994; Kille & Lyne, 1993). However, a title-deed does not
necessarily confer secure property rights, even if it is backed by an efficient legal system,
unless it confers a broad bundle of property rights including unfettered rights to exclude
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other users and to bequeath, rent, sell and pledge the property as collateral.
Farmers, including those in developing countries, are rational in their decision-making. To
understand the apparent lack of profit maximising behaviour displayed by livestock
farmers in the communal areas of sub-Saharan Africa, it is first necessary to understand the
institutional environment in which they operate. Property rights to land are fundamental
institutions that guide decisions to conserve and improve the land, and to adopt farming
practices and technologies that make profitable use of land in the long-run.
The first sub-section of this chapter reviews economic theories about relationships between
land rights, stocking rates, levels of investment and herd productivity. This is followed by
a sub-section dealing with measures of herd productivity in Botswana. This sub-section is
followed by a sub-section covering estimation of a conceptual recursive regression model
of the determinants of herd productivity. A section discussing institutional reform to
improve herd productivity concludes this chapter.
2.2 DETERMINANTS OF HERD PRODUCTVITY
2.2.1 Land tenure and herd productivity
In the communal areas of Botswana, property rights to grazing land are characterised by
open access or common property and are not secure in the economic sense. Economic
theory suggests that land tenure institutions influence decisions about stocking rates
(Gordon, 1954) and investments in improvements and operating inputs (Place et al., 1994:
16-17). Gordon (1954) shows that an open access resource will be used at equilibrium rate
when the private cost (Px) of exploiting the resource is equal to the value of the herd's
average product (VAP) . According to the hypothetical value product curves in figure 2.1,
the open access equilibrium occurs when 12 cows are stocked per hectare. At this point the
resource is over-utilised in the economic sense (and possibly in the biological sense)
because rents are zero. This is a departure from the profit maximising neoclassical model
where property rights are presumed to be exclusive. In this case, the profit maximising











Value of Marginal Product (VMP)
Figure 2.1 : Hyphothetical total , average and marginal value product curves
Source: Adapted from Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1990.
From the hypothetical value product curves in Figure 2.1, if cows and grazing land are
owned privately, six cows would be stocked as the sixth cow reduces the value of the
marginal product (VMP) to Px, the cost of keeping the additional cow on the range. Rents
indicated by the shaded area are maximised at this equilibrium point. Stocking rates
between the open access and private property equilibria are the outcome of horizontal
coordination (collective action 6) that defines common property.
Stocking rates are therefore expected to be higher on communal grazing lands than on
farms privately owned by individuals, ceteris paribus-especially when communal grazing
6 Here collective action is defined as action taken by a collaborating group, involving some degree of collective decision making in
pursuit ofmembers' perceived shared interest.
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is predominantly an open access resource. Consequently, herd productivity is expected to
be lower on communal grazing land. In KwaZulu-Natal where tenure conditions follow a
pattern similar to those observed in southern Botswana, Lyne and Nieuwoudt (1990) report
much lower calving rates and much higher herd mortality rates in communal areas than on
private farms.
There is no incentive for a communal farmer to reduce the size of his own herd, or to
finance fixed improvements (such as boreholes to water livestock) , on open access grazing
land because the benefits would accrue largely to free-riders. Lyne and Nieuwoudt (1990)
refer to the low investment problem as the "real tragedy of the commons". Under-
investment in fixed improvements leads to under-investment in complementary operating
inputs (Place & Hazell , 1993). Kille and Lyne (1993) also anticipate lower investment in
operating inputs applied to open access resources owing to allocative inefficiency. This
problem arises because there is no market for open access land owing to prohibitively high
transaction costs. By contrast, the market for privately-owned farmland creates an
opportunity cost for under-utilised land that encourages the owner to sell or rent the land
out to more effective farmers (place et al., 1994:17; Nieuwoudt, 1990). The land market
also strengthens incentives to conserve and improve land as the benefits can be realised at
any time by selling or leasing the land out (Pasour, 1990: 200-201). In Botswana, private
farmers also find it easier to finance improvements because there is a market for privately
owned land. Banks do not accept land as collateral for loans unless it has market value
(Place et aI., 1994: 17; Kille & Lyne, 1993; Migot-Adholla et aI., 1991). Improvements to
land and livestock tend to raise the productivity of operating inputs, encouraging more
intensive use of supplementary feed and medications that prevent disease and injury and
hence improve herd productivity.
2.2.2 Measures of herd productivity
This study takes the accepted view that herd productivity improves with a higher calving
rate (Hubbard, 1986:46) and with a lower mortality rate. By implication, a higher off-take
rate (sales and slaughter) is also an objective measure of better herd productivity. Scoones
(1992), Upton (1993); Lange et al. (1998) and the Ministry of Agriculture (1996) measure
herd productivity in terms of birth, death and off-take rates (sales and slaughter) of cattle.
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Upton (1993) expresses herd productivity as a function of calving, mortality, off-take rates
and other production traits (such as milk yield and draught power) in his herd growth
model. James and Charles (1996) argue that herd productivity measures the efficiency of a
livestock production system. Herd productivity measures tend to be less favourable in
communal areas because of higher stocking rates and under-investment in improved
pastures, supplementary feed, vaccinations and dipping materials (Thirtle, et al., 2000).
The herd off-take rate is often defined as the number of cattle sold and slaughtered less
livestock purchased during the period divided by the opening stock:
Off-take rate t = Nt + St - Rt_
Ht-1
where;
N, = number of cattle sold in year,
S, = number of cattle slaughtered in year;
R, = number ofcattle purchased in year, , and
Ht-1 = number of stock at the beginning of yeart.
Source: Fidzani, 1993.
2.1
Herd off-take should also account for removals through gifts of cattle, but social exchanges
are thought to neutralize between exchanges in and out of the herd and therefore cancel out
(Metzel et al., 1998). Off-take is often concentrated on livestock of particular sex and age
groups. Since fewer male cattle are needed in the breeding herd, there is generally larger
off-take of castrated males on private farms. In communal areas, oxen are often retained to
provide draught power. Moreover, the overall rate of off-take is distorted if animals in very
poor condition and unlikely to survive the winter are slaughtered for own consumption.
Official measures of off-take rate in Botswana exclude herd mortality. Although Hubbard
(1986: 46) advocates this approach to avoid interpretation problems, it does not address
concerns that off-take rates observed in Botswana may be overstated, and mortality rates
understated (Fidzani, 1993: 188-189).
Mortality rate is defined as the number of cattle that die during the current period divided
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by the opening stock. Mortality rate can be expressed as in equation 2.2. Mortality rates
vary between age groups with young stock more vulnerable than older animals. Mortality
rate is influenced by deaths caused by disease and drought.
Mortality rate t = Dt-0- Ht - 1
where;
D, = number of deaths in year,
H, = number of stock at the beginning ofthe year,
Source: Metzel, et aI., 1998.
2.2
Farmers tend to sell or slaughter cattle to avoid mortalities when they anticipate drought or
the spread of disease such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). Observed mortality rates are
understated in these circumstances.
The calving rate presented in equation 2.3, is computed as the number of calves born over
a specified period divided by the breeding cows and heifers in year.:
Calving rate, 2.3
where;
Ct = number ofcalves born in year,
BCt = breeding cows in year,
Bh, = breeding heifers in yeart
Source: Metzel, et al. , 1998.
Calving rate is influenced by factors such as the availability of a bull and condition of the
grazing range. If the range is in poor condition, few cows conceive even if there is a good
bull. Investing in improvement of the range, supplementary feeding, minerals salts and
good quality bulls can improve the calving rate (Metzel et aI., 1998; Mahabile et al.,
2002). Lange et al. (1998) argue that significant improvements in herd management and
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nutrition have increased calving rate to 80 per cent in Namibia. Higher calving rates would
result in higher levels of beef production in Botswana, ceteris paribus.
2.2.3 Conceptual recursive regression model of the determinants of herd
productivity
Following the economic arguments presented in section 2.2.1 postulating that farmers with
secure land tenure are both more willing and able to invest in agriculture, a block recursive
regression model was developed along the lines proposed by Place et al. (1994:28-30) to
identify and quantify the determinants of herd productivity observed in the study site. The
object of this empirical analysis is to appraise Botswana government policy on communal
grazing resources and to make informed policy recommendation.
The regression model was specified as follows:
(a) c =f(Xa, T,H)
(b) I =f(X a, T,CL)
(c) = f(X a, Cs, l)
(d) h = f (I, i)
where c represents the present value of agricultural credit (expressed in 2000 prices) used
to finance past fixed improvements and current operating expenses, I measures past
investment in fixed improvements to land, i is the current investment in operating inputs
per livestock unit, and h represent herd productivity. The vector X" represents household
and farmer characteristics, T is land tenure status, H the herd size, and CL and Cs are
separate measures of the present value of credit used to finance past fixed improvements
and current operating expenses respectively. An important and realistic assumption
underlying this model is that tenure is predetermined, i.e. farmers cannot change their
initial property rights at will.
Equation (a) argues that the present value of (long plus short-term) agricultural credit is
positively influenced by private ownership of land, higher liquidity and a larger herd size
(wealth). Positive relationships are expected because farmers with greater wealth and
liquidity are creditworthy as they have more collateral and better repayment ability
(Stanton, 1997). Private ownership of land not only strengthens the incentive to invest but
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also adds to the owner's stock of wealth and collateral as argued earlier. The household
and farmer characteristics include family size, off-farm income, marital status, the farmer's
age, education and gender (a dummy variable scoring one for male farmers and zero for
females). This variable is included to capture gender difference in the use of credit. Off-
farm wage income is a relatively important and reliable source of liquidity for many rural
households and is therefore expected to impact positively on access to credit owing to
better debt-servicing ability. Age could also carry a positive sign as it measures
accumulated farming experience and social standing. A high social standing can reduce
transaction costs (Goetz, 1992). On the other hand, age could carry a negative sign as older
farmers may be risk averse and less inclined to innovate than younger farmers (Basabrain,
1983). Education is expected to impact positively on the use of credit because it reduces
transaction costs in formal markets and enhances allocative efficiency so improving a
farmer's creditworthiness (Fidzani, 1993: 118). Gender, on the other hand, is expected to
carry a negative sign if females face higher transaction costs than males. Fenwick and
Lyne (1999) argue that this is true in rural KwaZulu-Natal where women married under
customary law create greater legal uncertainty for lenders. In Botswana too, a women
married in community of property (including women married under customary law) cannot
borrow without legal consent from their husbands.
Equation (b) postulates that investment in fixed improvements is positively influenced by
private ownership and better access to long-term credit. Secure land tenure strengthens the
farmer's incentive to invest. Few improvements are expected where land tenure is insecure
as future returns are discounted at a high rate owing to uncertainty (Kille & Lyne, 1993).
In this case, uncertainty stems largely from future returns lost to other stockowners (free-
riders) who share inclusive rights to communal grazing. Access to long-term credit
improves farmer's ability to finance fixed improvements. Positive collinearity between
tenure and the present value of long-term credit is likely in view of the arguments
presented earlier in section 2.2. Household and farmer characteristics are included largely
as control variables although education is expected to carry a positive sign as it serves as a
proxy for permanent income (Graham & Darroch, 2001) and family size is expected to
carry a negative sign owing to a trade-off between consumption and investment. Age on
the other hand is expected to carry a positive sign as it proxies experience and exposure to
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investment opportunities.
Equation (c) states that current investment in operating inputs per livestock unit is
positively influenced by fixed improvements to land and better access to short-term credit.
Again, the ability to finance operating inputs is expected to improve with better access to
short-term credit, while investment in fixed improvements is expected to increase the
productivity of these inputs thus strengthening the incentive to purchase them (Place &
Hazell, 1993). Hayes et al. (1997) show that investment in wells positively influenced
expenditure in commercial inputs in Gambia. Household and farmer characteristics are
included largely as control variables with expected signs similar to those postulated for
equation (b). Pudasaini (1983) found that better education raised agricultural productivity
in Nepal.
Equation (d) expresses herd productivity as a positive function of past investment in fixed
improvements and current investment in operating inputs per livestock unit. Fidzani's
(1993: 187-190) study of cattle off-take rates in Botswana supports Place et al. ' s (1994:
28-29) argument that investment in fixed improvements (like boreholes and fences) and
operating inputs (such as feed supplements and vaccines) will increase herd productivity.
Investment in boreholes, supplementary feed and vaccines is expected to reduce mortality
rates and improve calving and off-take rates. Positive collinearity between past investment
in fixed improvements and expenditure on operating inputs per livestock unit is likely
following the logic ofequation (c).
Factors that do not vary across respondents in a cross-sectional study cannot be considered
when estimating the model. For this reason, variables such as weather, interest rate and
diseases that determine herd productivity were excluded from the model.
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM TO IMPROVE HERD PRODUCTIVITY
Following the economic arguments presented in section 2.2, the obvious (but often
impractical) policy option to improve herd productivity is to privatise communal land to
individual owner-operators. The exclusion ofother users would encourage farmers to stock
their land at the rent-maximising equilibrium (where VMP = Px) resulting in stocking rates
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below the maximum sustainable level (where VMP = 0) given Px > 0 and that farmers
discount future income at a rate consistent with the time preferences of society.
Privatisation of grazing land with fully transferable land rights also promotes allocative
efficiency because transaction costs are relatively low when a sale or lease agreement can
be negotiated with just one owner (Kille & Lyne, 1993; Swallow & Kamara, 2000). Land
transfers to the most effective users as the market imposes an opportunity cost on under-
utilised land (Kille & Lyne, 1993). An opportunity cost is imposed on the owner in the
form of forgone sale or rental income for land that is under-utilised. If the owner is unable
to use the land himself, he/she can sell the land or rent it out to someone who can use it
more profitably. There is an incentive to maintain and improve the resource because the
benefits can be fully internalised through higher profits and capital gains (Place & Hazell,
1993). In theory, privatisation of grazing land to individuals could solve both the
overstocking and low herd productivity problems but this policy option may not be
politically or economically feasible in areas where communal grazing has many poor
users; achieving farm sizes large enough to warrant the cost of fencing will inevitably
involve distress sales that dispossess the poorest users. While privatisation may be feasible
in a small part of Botswana, a "second-best" strategy built on common property may be
more appropriate if land tenure is a significant determinant of low herd productivity in the
country's communal areas.
A common property resource, like an open access resource, is shared by multiple users, but
the group is well-defined and enforces rules that limit the rate at which the resource is
exploited (Stevenson , 1991; Runge, 1981; Lyne & Nieuwoudt (1990). In theory,
participants in common property have 'coequal rights' to the resource. Rules that govern
users ' responsibilities in resource extraction may be formal or informal. Common property
groups can exist as user or non-user groups. Members of a user group make independent
decisions within the limits established by the group. The group may, for example, agree on
maximum stocking rates for members but each member manages his or her own herd.
Rents , in a user-group are positive but allocative efficiency is unlikely as use rights seldom
transfer to more efficient users outside the group owing to high transaction costs (Lyne,
1995). Investment in improvements is also unlikely because rules encouraging collective
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investment by sharing benefits in proportion to the contributions made by each member are
difficult to negotiate and apply (Lyne, 1995) in all but very small groups.
Costs of a collective action increase with the size of the group. Consequently, user groups
that succeed in making and enforcing rules that prevent unsustainable use of common pool
resources tend to be relatively small and those that succeed in making and enforcing more
complex rules that encourage members to invest in shared improvements tend to be even
smaller. Olson (1971) suggests that significant investment would require user groups with
no more than six members. However, if members of the group delegate control to a
manager and define members' property rights in terms of voting and benefit rights rather
than use rights, a larger group size may promote rather than constrain collective
investment.
In this (non-user group) case, members hire or elect experts to manage their joint
enterprise. Such ventures require accountable management for financial performance
(Knight et aI., (2003). Accountability is facilitated by transparency (e.g. in reporting
audited financial statements) and sound electoral process, but is best assured by the ability
of members to sanction management by withdrawing their investment.
A member's initial investment in the joint enterprise could be financed by exchanging
cattle for equity capital (i.e. shares) in the operating entity. Ideally the operating entity
would be organised as an investor-owned firm (lOF) such as a private company. Knight et
al. (2003) argue that a private company offers well-defined property rights that create
strong incentives for investment and financial performance because (a) there is direct
proportionality between a shareholder's investment and his or her voting and benefit
(dividends and capital gains) rights, and (b) shares can be traded at their market value. This
eliminates free-rider problems that manifest as 'horizon', 'portfolio', 'control', and
'influence' problems that discourage members from investing in other types of business
organization (Sykuta & Cook, 2001; Cook & Illiopoulus, 1999 & 2000). If, for example,
the non-user group were organized as a conventional cooperative, there would be very
little incentive for members to finance the enterprise because a conventional cooperative
does not assign benefits and voting rights in proportion to equity contributions, nor can
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members sell shares at their market value. The 'horizon' problem results from residual
claims that do not extend as far as the economic life of the underlying asset (Porter &
Scully, 1987). Under these circumstances traditional cooperative members tend to under-
invest in long-term and intangible assets (such as product promotion) because they are
prevented from realising any capital gains by retiring shares at their market value. New
members become free-riders as they benefit from investments without paying fully for
them in the form ofhigher share prices.
A portfolio problem also arises when members cannot trade shares at market prices, as
they are unable to diversify or concentrate their own asset portfolios to fully reflect
personal risk preferences and therefore tend to under invest in the joint enterprise (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). The control problem refers to the cost that members face in
monitoring managers to ensure that they make prudent investment decisions and do not
cheat. Although this principal-agent problem is not unique to institutions like traditional
cooperatives, it is less severe in private companies where (a) larger investors are able to
internalise the benefits of their policing effort (because the dividends are proportional to
the investment), (b) the agents performance is signalled by the audited value of members'
equity shares and (c) the agents are shareholders themselves and therefore have incentive-
compliant employment contracts (Knight et al., 2003).
These problems tend to starve traditional cooperatives of equity capital, reducing their
ability to finance investments needed to maintain a competitive edge. Hendrikse and
Veerman (2001) further argue that traditional cooperatives are at a disadvantage relative to
private companies when seeking capital from external sources to finance assets that have
specific uses. Specific assets increase the financer's exposure to risks, and lenders find it
difficult to influence the managerial decisions to reduce the exposure when many small
investors hold a majority of equal or near equal voting rights. This "influence problem"
tends to raise the cost of external equity and debt capital to finance assets that have specific
uses (Knight et al., 2003).
Non-user groups represent Horizontal Integration, an extreme form of Horizontal
Coordination and analogous to Vertical Integration. The success of a horizontally
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integrated group depends fundamentally on its institutional arrangement, particularly those
which provide for direct proportionality between investment and voting and benefit rights
and for exit by selling shares at market value - as in IOFs. Many successful commercial
farming operators in southern Africa are organised as private or public companies.
A shift from open access to a traditional common property user group and then on to a
non-user group structured as an IOF like a private company represents a shift from open
access towards private ownership by an individual, with expected improvements in
stocking rates, investment and hence herd productivity while avoiding problems associated
with size economies and distress sales.
CHAPTER 3 DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS
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3.1 SURVEY DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
A sample survey of private and communal farmers in Botswana was conducted from
August 1999 to May 2000 to elicit information about herd productivity, investment, use of
credit and farmer and household characteristics. These data were used to estimate an
empirical model of determinants of herd productivity. The first part of this chapter outlines
the sampling technique and the second part provides a descriptive summary of the data.
3.1.1 Sample Survey Desigu
Collection of primary field data usually involves a trade-off between concentrating the
study, or spreading it over a larger region. The former enables the researcher to estimate
more precise statistics for a study population (e.g. cattle farmers in southern Botswana)
that is less representative of the target population (e.g. cattle farmers in Botswana). The
latter improves accuracy at the expense of sampling precision. Precision refers to variance
in the sample statistics; the trade-off is between accuracy and precision when the research
budget is limited (Barnett, 1991: 17).
A stratified random sample design was used to sample the study population. The strata
comprised of private and communal cattle farmers respectively (as the object was to
explore differences between these groups) and a random sample of cattle farmers was
drawn from a list of all cattle farmers (i.e. a list frame) constructed for each stratum. The
study population, however, did not cover all of rural Botswana; given the extensive nature
of livestock farming in Botswana and limited amounts of both time and money, the study
was confined to the country's southern region (Figure 3.1) where there is a good mix of
communal and private grazing land and, within this region, to four representative villages:
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Figure 3.1: Map of Botswana indicating the study area
Source: Prepared by Ministry ofAgriculture, 2000a.
Communal and private cattle farmers residing in these villages were identified and listed
with the assistance of extension staff employed by the Department of Animal Health and
Production. The study population comprised of 517 communal (open access) farmers and
54 private farmers.
A sample of 80 communal and 40 private farmers was drawn randomly from these lists.
Unfortunately, several of the selected farmers had left the study area and some were
unwilling to participate in the survey. This attrition left 65 communal and 31 private
farmers as respondents. The drop outs were not replaced owing to the high cost of
travelling long distances between farmers, especially those on private ranches. The
ultimate sampling rates were therefore 12.6 percent and 57 percent respectively for the
study populations of communal and private (Table 3.1). Private farmers were sampled
more heavily as they tend to be relatively less homogenous than communal farmers
(Fidzani, 1993) and to ensure sufficient cases for analysis.
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The descriptive statistics reported in this chapter relate only to (unbiased) sample estimates
computed for each stratum. The intention was to contrast the strata and not to compute
unbiased estimators for the study population of communal and private farmers .
\ .
Although there is variation in climate and the quality of grazing within the southern region,
ranging from the wetter and more fertile 'Limpopo unit ' in the east to dry sandve ld in the
west, grazing conditions in the . study region are similar to those in other regions of
Botswana where cattle are kept (Gulbradnsen, 1980: 1). The southern region has an area of
26, 776 km2, a population of 146,000 people and aggregate herd of some 180,000 cattle
(Central Statistics Office, 1995). It therefore accounts for about ten percent of the county's
rural population and seven percent of its national herd.
3.1.2 The Survey Instrument
A structured questionnaire that consisted of pre-coded and open- ended questions was
designed and administered to the sampled households. Communal and private farmers
were asked the same questions. Interviews were conducted from August 1999 to May 2000
with the assistance of four enumerators who spoke both Setswana and English. Each
respondent was visited monthly over a period of nine months . This time lag enabled the
author to monitor pregnant cows and so estimate the calving percentage for each
respondent's herd. Enumerators were given in-depth orientation on the objectives of the
survey and training in the use of the survey instrument. Questions were addressed to the
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head of the household in all cases. Field work was closely supervised by the author.
Monthly data were collected on variables such as biological production, livestock sales and
milk production. In cases where respondents were not available, a second visit was
scheduled during the same month. The data were captured in a computerised spreadsheet
and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Science, Version 10 (SPSS, 1999).
Inventories of cattle, assets owned and agricultural credit used were taken at the beginning
of the study in August 1999 and at the end of May 2000. Estimates of mean herd size, herd
composition, off-take, calving and mortality rates compared favourably with national and
regional statistics obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, (2000b), Central Statistics
Office (1999) and Botswana Meat Commission (2000).
3.2 CONTENTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The following sub-sections provide an overview of key information elicited by the survey
instrument.
3.2.1 Household and Farmer Characteristics
This section of the questionnaire (Appendix I) gathered demographic information about
the household and its head as primary decision-maker on matters relating to the use of
agricultural resources. Questions about household needs, occupation, location of
employment, wage income, educational status and farming experience were included as
possible determinants of efficiency and the adoption of new technology. Education and
accumulated experience in farming are thought to improve allocative efficiency and to
reduce information and transaction costs that constrain the adoption oftechnology (Welch,
1978).
3.2.2 Sources of Household Cash Income
The questionnaire elicited information about household income earned from sources other
than cattle. This question is pertinent because cash remittances, especially those which are
reliable, influence the liquidity and creditworthiness of the farmer. Other sources of
income often determine whether the farmer can invest in cattle production activities such
as buying improved bulls and other conventional inputs such as supplementary feed, drugs
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and vaccines. Other sources of income also influence herd size, as any savings made by the
households in Botswana are usually invested in additional cattle (Harvey & Lewis, 1990:
72).
3.2.3 Agricultural Assets
This section asked questions about farming machinery and equipment owned by the
farmer. This was to enable the author to assess the equity position of the farmer. These
assets also influence access to markets. Farmers who do not have adequate agricultural
assets such as trucks and tractors face problems when, for example, transporting cattle to
markets or when transporting livestock feed. Fodder production would also be limited
without adequate agricultural equipment and implements.
3.2.4 Cattle Inventory
This section assessed the beginning and end of year inventories of cattle. These data are
needed to measure herd productivity indicators. The number ofMafisa-in (cattle which the
household is keeping and managing but which belong to someone else) and mafisa-out
(cattle which the farmer owns but are loaned to another farmer) were recorded. This
information was required to distinguish herd size from the farmer's own wealth. The
reasons for keeping mafisa cattle were also established. For example, some farmers keep
mafisa cattle because they do not have enough cattle for draught power and some mafisa-in
to provide milk to the household. Some farmers mafisa-in because they want to increase
their own herd size because calves that are born from mafisa cattle are shared
proportionally; for every two calves born of mafisa, the herder is usually given one calf.
The principle of mafisa-out cattle is alleged to have been used when a farmer did not want
to declare the total number of cattle he owned to avoid taxes and death duties (Harvey &
Lewis , 1990: 75). Some mafisa-out cattle for children born out of wedlock. Presumably
most people who mafisa-out work off-farm and do not have the time to manage cattle.
3.2.5 Biological Production
This section collected disaggregated data on the number of cattle at the beginning of the
study, the number of calves born each month and the breed of the mother. The age of the
cow at calving, calf and cow mortalities and causes of their death were also recorded. The
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number of cattle purchased during the study period was also established. These data are
needed to calculate calving and mortality rates. This section played an important role in
testing the hypothesis that herd productivity of private farmers is higher than that of
communal farmers. Some open-ended questions were asked on some of the factors that
affected calving and mortality rates.
3.2.6 Livestock Sales
Disaggregated data on livestock sales were collected. Data on the number and type of
animals (bulls, cows, oxen, etc.) sold, where they were sold and reasons for sale were
established. Direct sales of cattle, either as live or slaughtered, provided a very important
statistic to measure off-take rate. This information was also crucial to establish the most
common type of cattle sold. It is alleged that most communal farmers sell young steers and
heifers rather than oxen because oxen are kept for draught power (Scoones, 1992). It is
also common for communal farmers to sell cattle to meet societal needs such as paying
school fees for children, paying dowry (bride price) and meeting funeral expenses
(Behnke, 1987). The questions regarding the factors that motivate the sale of cattle were
included to ascertain the extent to which farmers sell cattle to meet societal
responsibilities. Questions on the exchange of cattle were also asked. Farmers often
exchange cattle (cow for an ox) to meet societal needs such as providing meat during
funerals. Cows are rarely slaughtered for providing meat because they are kept for
breeding purposes.
3.2.7 Milk Production
The amounts of milk produced, consumed and sold were recorded, as were the place(s)
where milk was sold. It was established whether milk was sold fresh or sour (madila). It
was also established whether there was any processing of milk before it was sold. This
section was also to provide information to assess the economic value of milk produced.
The farm gate price was used to assess the value of milk that was sold or consumed.
3.2.8 Draught Power and Other Livestock By-products
Cattle provide draught power and transportation. In this section the author investigated the
kind of services cattle provide to farmers. Many communal farmers in developing
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countries use cattle manure as a partial substitute for commercial fertilisers (Scoones,
1992). Respondents were also asked if they used cattle manure as fertiliser, and how much
cattle manure was used or sold. Information on the number of hides and skins from
slaughtered cattle was collected. Respondents were asked the type of curing used. The
value of the hides was computed using the local market price.
3.2.9 Herd Management Practice
Questions were asked to assess the quality of herd management. Respondents indicated
whether or not they treated their cattle against tick-borne diseases and internal worms, and
whether or not they dehorned and castrated calves because these management practices
have been shown to improve the growth of calves (Ministry of Agriculture, 1989). Data
were collected on whether farmers provided any supplementary feeding to their cattle. The
type of feed, cost of feed and where it was bought were established. Watering sources were
established and whether the household owned any watering sources. If the livestock farmer
did not own the water source, the amount of watering fees paid was established.
Respondents were asked whether they vaccinated cattle against diseases other than those
vaccinated free by Government. If they did, the cost of vaccination was established.
Livestock farmers were asked whether they used artificial insemination (AI) in their herd.
Artificial insemination is a very effective way of improving herd quality when farmers do
not have sufficient liquidity to purchase improved bulls (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991).
For example, the total cost for insemination and feed for a cow on a government farm is
about P6.00 (US$1.12) while the cost ofa bull ranges from P5 000-P30 000 per bull.
3.2.10 Property Rights to Grazing Land
This section established the land tenure status for each respondent. Place and Hazell (1993)
argue that farmers are less willing and less able to improve land when their tenure is
insecure in the economic sense (section 2.2.1). If grazing was leased in, length of the lease
was established. Respondents were asked whether rules restricting access to communal
grazing had been negotiated and enforced, and whether penalties were imposed on those
who exceeded the limits. Some open-ended questions on the farmers' perception on some
problems facing the cattle industry were also asked.
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3.2.11 Cost of Cattle Production
In this section of the questionnaire, farmers were asked about the costs they incurred in
cattle production, including the opportunity cost of household labour used in herding and
other ranching activities. Family labour costs are crucial in livestock farming owing to the
relative scarcity of hired labour for herding cattle. Other costs included costs of fodder
production, drugs and vaccines, and feed supplements. The cost of fencing the farm and
cost of drilling a borehole were also determined. These costs indicate levels of investment
and hence the respondent 's incentive and ability to finance a productive enterprise.
3.2.12 Use of Credit
Efforts were made to establish the amount of long-term and short-term credit used and its
sources. The purpose and repayment levels of loans were established. The aim was to
determine what share of investment made in fixed improvements and expenditure on
operating inputs was financed with credit. Amounts borrowed historically to finance long-
term investments were adjusted for inflation and expressed in constant 2000 prices. These
long-term investments included improvements made to grazing land such as drilling
boreholes and constructing fences.
3.3 CHALLENGES FACED DURING DATA COLLECTION
The general tendency of Botswana cattle farmers is to avoid disclosing (especially to a
stranger), the correct number of cattle they own and the value of loans borrowed from
banks. Many farmers are said to be heavily indebted to financial institutions such as the
National Development Bank (Bank of Botswana, 2000). Researchers asking questions on
cattle ownership are usually viewed with suspicion. This apprehension of farmers' dates
back to the colonial era when taxes were based on the number of cattle the farmer owned.
Farmers therefore refused to disclose the number of cattle the households owned to avoid
paying taxes. Some farmers lent out cattle as mafisa to avoid taxes.
Mis-reporting of data is therefore likely to be a problem. The following measures were
taken to ensure that this problem was minimised. Firstly, the officer from the Department
of Animal Health and Production accompanied the researchers to introduce us and explain
/
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the purpose of the study, and assured the farmers that the information collected would not
be used for anything other than to meet the objectives of the study. Secondly, during the
data collection, questions that were asked had follow-up questions so that if a farmer
provided incorrect information, a subsequent question would help to reveal the
inconsistency. For example, the question on the number of calves born would be followed
later by another asking how many calves were male and how many were female. Follow-
up visits to farmers were made to rectify inconsistencies that were identified. Enumerators
occasionally made visits to the cattle kraals to make physical counts ofcattle. Government
cattle crush7 reports from the Southern region were examined to check the data.
The other major challenge was that of absentee farmers, especially private farmers. In
some cases, researchers followed farmers to their work places (for those working in
Botswana) to collect data. In many occasions visits were rescheduled because the farmers
preferred responding to the questionnaire at the farm. Another problem was poor record
keeping by many farmers. Most of the information was obtained from the farmers through
recall and physical observation.
3.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This section summarises the key results of the survey. It also identifies the behaviour of
some of the variables that are used to test the research hypothesis in chapter 4.
Independent, t-tests were calculated to check for significant univariate differences between
group means computed for private and communal farmers.
3.4.1 Farmer Characteristics
Table 3.2 summarises key attributes of sample farmers and their households. No
significant differences were detected between the mean age, gender, family size or
residential status (where heads residing on their farms scored a one, and zero otherwise) of
private and communal livestock farmers.
7 A holding pen for vaccination and cattle counting .
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Racial differences were not considered because all but one of the respondents were black.
These findings are consistent with results from an earlier study in Botswana by Panin
(1999). Most herds are managed by older, married men who reside on-farm with their
(large) rural families, and who regard livestock farming as their main occupation .
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for demographic characteristics of 96 livestock
owners in the southern region of Botswana, 2000
Private
Open access




Average age Years 55 (36.25) 52 (32.20) 1.37
Gender % male 94 (1.44) 95 (2.55) 0.40
Average size of household # 6 (19.46) 7 (19.54) -1.12
Married % 97 (30.00) 63 (10.45) 4.62 **
Residential status % on-farm 88 (10.00) 92 (14.00) 0.61
Average years of schooling Years 10 (14.66) 2 (9.52) 8.32 **
Average years of farming Years 31 (70.23) 20 (30.34) 4.85 **
Main source of income:
Farming 55 55
%
Wage work 10 23
Other 35 22
Mean monthly income remitted
Pula 2308 (2.47) 715 (2.62) -2.74 **by wage workers





Gross annual livestock income Pula 98363 (1.27) 3049 (6.41) 1.23
Note: ** shows statisticalsignificance at the onc percent level of probability.
estimates in parenthesisrepresentthe percentage coefficientof variation.
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Despite these similarities, private and communal farmers in the sample differed on some
important household variables. Private farmers appear to have accumulated a much greater
stock of human capital through both formal education and farming experience. In addition,
private farmers have much larger cash inflows from wage remittances and livestock sales,
and are therefore more liquid than communal farmers.
3.4.2 Livestock Ownership and Herd Productivity Indicators
Herd size and composition on private and communal grazing land are presented in Table
3.3. Average herd size is substantially larger on private farms.
Table 3.3: Mean herd size, composition and distribution on private and communal





















Private Open access communal
t-value
ranches (n=31) grazing (0=65)
495 (5.32) 55 (12.09) 2.26 *
273 (7.57) 26 (14.87) 4.05 ***
141 (3.58) 8 (5.53) 3.36 ***
20 (1.83) 15 (7.38) 1.65 +
5 (3.99) 1 (5.51) 3.43 *
56 (1.53) 5 (3.71) 1.39
12 (1.14) 1 (2.54) 1.07










Notes: and ** sh~w ~tatistical significance at the five and one percent level ofprobability respectively .
+ shows significance at ten percent level of probability.
estimates in parenthesis represent the percentage coefficient ofvariation .
39
Almost 60 percent of herds kept by private farmers exceeded 280 head of cattle, while 80
percent of those kept by communal farmers numbered less than 80 head. Communal
farmers tend to have fewer calves per cow than private farms. The higher proportion of
bulls may indicate that private farmers invest in improving their stock by buying bulls for
their herd while communal farmers value cattle primarily as a store of wealth because they
cannot maximise profit under conditions of open access. This would explain why the off-
take rate (Table 3.4) is much lower amongst communal farmers.
Sample means and proportions for indicators of herd productivity and investments made
by private and communal farmers are presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Mean productivity and investment indicators for open access and private
livestock owners in a sample of 96 farmers in the southern region of
Botswana, 2000
Private
Variable ranches Open access communal t-value
Unit (n=31) I!razinl! (n-65)
Aggregate herd size LU
I 262 (2.94) 30 (7.31) 2.59 *
Calving rate % 66 (33.49) 35 (10.10) 7.75 **
Off-take rate % 20 (6.66) 129 (7.78) 2.46 *
Mortality rate % 2 (2.91) 5 (4.22) 2.15
De-worm % 87 (11.18) 37 (18.76) **5.64
De-horn % 86 (12.49) 84 (6.12) 3.00 **
Practice supplementary feeding % 80 (16.21). 63 (7.37) 2.91 **
Vaccinate % 87 (14.22) 38 (6.19) 5.74 **
Treat cattle against ticks % 71 (8.56) 44 (7.18) 3.21 **
Financed own borehole % 77 (9.32) 7 (10.04) **8.20
Fencing % 100 0
Annual gross margin per LU
Pula 1336 (1.39)





Notes : LU Livestock Unit defined as a mature animal with a live weight of 500 kg.
21 Pula= 0.1865 US$ (in 2000).
*and ** s~o~ statistical significance at the five and one percent level of probability respectively.
+ shows Significance at ten percent level of probability .
estimates in parenthesis represent the percentage coefficient ofvariation.
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With regard to herd productivity, the calving rate and off-take (i.e. sales plus slaughtering)
rates are much higher on private farms than amongst communal farmers.
This is consistent with findings reported by Behnke (1987); Scoones (1992) and the
Central Statistics Office (1995). On the other hand, the mortality rate is lower on private
farms where the incidence of de-worming, dehorning, supplementary feeding, vaccination
and dipping against tick-borne diseases is much higher (Table 3.4). The incidence of
fencing and borehole ownership is substantially higher on private farms. These findings are
consistent with the arguments in chapter 2 that decisions about stocking rates and
investment (in operating inputs and improvements to land and herds) are adversely
affected by insecure property rights to open access grazing. Unable to internalise benefits,
maximise profits, or raise loan finance, communal farmers tend to keep cattle as a store of
wealth rather than as a commercial enterprise (Jarvis, 1980).
3.4.3 Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients
Zero-order correlation coefficient (r) indicates the extent to which quantifiable pairs of
variables are linearly associated. If there is collinearity between variables in a regression
model that assumes them to be independent the parameters of the model become
indeterminate and it is impossible to obtain numerical values for each parameter separately
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977: 233). Multicollinearity can also lead to model mis-specification
when a relevant variable is rejected because its standard error is too high (Gujarati, 1995:
341). Zero-order correlation coefficients were computed to assess the degree of linear
association between pairs of variables relevant to this study. Variables that are strongly
correlated were subjected to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the
multicollinearity problem.
Table 3.5 presents zero-order correlation coefficients for productivity indicators and some
possible explanatory variables. Within the set of productivity measures, off-take rate is
significantly and positively correlated with gross margin per livestock unit (GM/LU), and
calving rate is significantly and negatively correlated with herd mortality rate. These
relationships suggest a role for Principal Components Analysis (PCA) in constructing a
"productivity index" (Nieuwoudt, 1977). Welch (1978) postulates a positive relationship
between farm scale, education and the adoption of technology. The data are consistent with
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this view as variable costs (associated with de-worming and treatment for tick-borne
diseases) and investment in fencing are positively correlated with education and herd size
(LV). As anticipated, private land tenure (private land = 1 and open access = 0) is
positively correlated with investment in technology and fixed improvements, and hence
with productivity measures such as the calving and off-take rate.
However, private ownership is also positively correlated with education, experience, wage
remittances and herd size. This suggests that a multivariate, recursive model is required to
untangle the causes of observed differences in herd productivity and investment. While
land tenure appears to be an important determinant of investment and herd productivity, it
is clearly not the only variable of policy interest. A more rigorous analysis of the survey
data is required to isolate and quantify the partial contribution of land tenure to herd
productivity. This is the purpose ofthe next chapter.
Table 3.5: Correlation coefficients for important livestock variables in a sample of 96 farmers in the southern region of Botswana, 2000
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Variable Units 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Present value of agric credit Pula 1.00
2 Present value of investment in boreholes Pula .110 1.00
3 Expenditure on operating inputs Pula .210 .250* 1.00
4 Calving rate % .016 .646** .102 1.00
5 Offtake rate % .096 .061 .076 -.064 1.00
6 Mortality rate % .658** -.219* .110 -.314** .012 1.00
7 Tenure .202* .719** .326 ** .523** .239* -.168 1.00
8 Gross margin Pula/LU .183 .126 .127 .143 .308 ** -.033 .187 1.00
9 Herd size No .193 .271** .035 .291 ** .269** -.101 .376** .914** 1.00
10 Experience Years .084 .138 .165 .2 11* -.014 .043 .173 .030 .084 1.00
11 Education Years .208* .558** .351** .395** .142 -.137 .713** .065 .266** .127 1.00
12 Income Pula .247* .443** .053 .312* -.014 -.188 .396** .260* .368** -.142 .371** 1.00
I
Note: " and ** show statistical significance at five and one percent level of probability respectively.
CHAPTER 4
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ESTIMATING THE DETERMINANTS OF HERD
PRODUCTIVITY
4.1 ESTIMATED RECURSIVE REGRESSION MODEL
This chapter presents an estimated recursive regression model and empirical results of
determinants ofherd productivity.
For estimation purposes, equations (a) through (d) in section 2.2.3 were specified as
follows:
c = Bm+BlIAGE +B21GENDER +B31MARRIED + B41EDUCATION
+ BS1LIQUIDITY1+ B61FAMILY + B71HERD +BS1TENURE .... (4.1)
where;
c = present value of agricultural credit used to finance past fixed improvements and current
operating expenses measured in Pula,
AGE = age ofthe household head measured in years,
GENDER = a dummy variable scoring one for male heads and zero for females,
MARRIED = a dummy variable scoring one for married heads and zero otherwise,
EDUCATION = years of formal schooling completed by the household head,
LIQUIDITY1= monthly income remitted by household wage workers measured in Pula,
FAMILY = household size,
HERD = herd size, and
TENURE = a dummy variable scoring one if land is privately owned and zero if it is an
open access communal resource.
LN (l) = B02 +B l2AGE + B22GENDER + B32MARRIED + B42EDUCATION
+ Bs2LIQUIDITY1+B62FAMILY +BnCL +BS2TENURE ... (4.2)
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where;
LN (l) = natural log of one plus the present value of investment in boreholes measured in
Pula, and
CL = present value of long-term credit used to finance boreholes, the most frequently
observed improvement and the only one for which reliable data could be gathered.
LN (i) = B03 + B13AGE + B23GENDER + B33MARRIED + B43EDUCATION
+ B53FAMILY + B63LN (I) + B73 (LIQUIDITY2) •.• (4.3)
where;
LN (i) = natural log of one plus current expenditure on operating inputs per livestock unit
measured in Pula, and
Cs = value of seasonal credit used to finance current operating inputs.
Positive collinearity anticipated between Cs and LIQUIDITY l was addressed by summing
the two variables (i.e. Cs + LIQUIDITYl ) to create an index called LIQUIDITY2
h = B04 + Bl4LN (l+i)
where;
h = herd productivity measured as the calving rate.
... (4.4)
The calving rate was computed as the number of calves born divided by number of
breeding cows and heifers. Off-take and mortality rates were not used as measures of
productivity because animals in poor condition are sold or slaughtered for own
consumption. This tends to understate mortality rates and to overstate off-take rates
(Fidzani, 1993: 188-189).
Positive collinearity anticipated between investment in boreholes and expenditure on
operating inputs per livestock unit was addressed by summing these two variables (i.e. LN
(l+i)).
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The variables c, I, i and h are endogenous. For this reason, only equations 4.1 and 4.2 were
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. In equations 4.3 and 4.4 the
endogenous explanatory variables were replaced with instrumental variables to eliminate
possible correlation with the error term. These equations were estimated using Two Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) regression with the instrumental variables predicted from all of the
exogenous variables in the model.
4.2 PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Estimation of equations 4.1-4.4 revealed multicollinearity problems. Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) was applied to try and reduce multicollinearity. The main aim ofPCA is to
convert the original set of variables, Xj's (j = 1, 2,...,p) into a new set of variables or
principal components (Yj) which are linear combinations ofthe old variables (Xj's):
where ajip are loading coefficients chosen such that the principal components are (a)
uncorrelated (orthogonal) and (b) the first principal component accounts for the maximum
share of the total variation in the original set of variables, the second principal component
accounts for the maximum share of the remaining variation in the Xj's and so on
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977: 425). Principal Component Analysis is a mathematical
maximization procedure where each successive component accounts for the maximum
amount ofthe variance that is left (Maddala, 1977: 193; Stevens, 1992: 375-376). PCA can
be used to economise on variables, to analyse relationships between variables or as in this
study, to address the problem of multicollinearity by transforming collinear original
variables into new orthogonal (uncorrelated) variables (Koutsoyiannis, 1977: 424-436).
Multicollinearity impairs the estimates of the variables due to lack of sufficient
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independent variation in the sample.
4.3 THE RECURSIVE REGRESSION RESULTS
The regression results presented in the following sub-sections show that all four of the
equations estimated for the recursive model are statistically significant. Their R
2
values
range from 40 to 58 percent and compare favourably with other similar cross-section
studies (Place & Hazell, 1993; Hayes et al., 1997; Matangul et al., 2001).
4.3.1 The Present Value of Agricultural Credit (c)
The regression results for equation 4.1 explaining value of agricultural credit are presented
in Table 4.1. The coefficient estimated for the variable GENDER is positive and has a t-
value larger than unity suggesting that the present value of long-term and short-term credit
used by respondents is higher for farmers who are male.
The variables HERD and TENURE are not independent (r=0.376) and it was not possible
to estimate their separate contributions to the level of agricultural credit. Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) was therefore used to construct an index from these two
variables. The first principal component was estimated as:
PC1= 0.829 (standardised HERD)+O .829 (standardised TENURE)
with an eigen value of 1.4. This index accounted for 69 percent of variation in HERD and
TENURE and was included in equation 4.1 as a positive measure of the original variables.
The regression coefficient estimated for this index is positive and highly significant and
carries the largest beta value. TENURE therefore appears to be the underlying determinant
of agricultural credit used by respondents because current herd size is more likely to be
influenced by tenure status than vice versa. Respondents with private farms and larger
herds are both willing and able to access more agricultural credit. This finding supports the
arguments presented in sub section 2.2.3.
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Table 4.1: OLS regression results for agricultural credit (c)
Dependent variable: Present value of agricultural credit used to finance past fixed
improvements and current operating expenses measured in Pula (c)
Coefficient Beta t-value
Intercept 28165 0.40
AGE 674 0.01 0.05
GENDER 65727 0.12 1.10
MARRIED 35986 0.10 0.78
FAMILY 3124 0.05 0.43
EDUCATION 5123 0.12 0.79
LlQUIDITY 1 -1.23 -0.02 -0.02







*** significant at one percent level of probability.
** significant at five per cent level of probability.
* significant at ten percent level of probability.
Contrary to expectations, LIQUIDITY) is not statistically significant when proxied by
wage income. To some extent this might reflect Botswana's Financial Assistance Policy
(FAP) and the generous terms of government lending agencies (such as the National
Development Bank (NDB» arid grant schemes such as that administered by the Citizen
Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA).
The Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP) and Services to Livestock Owners
in Communal Areas (SLOCA) provided financial support to many cattle producers
including farmers who may not have been considered creditworthy by commercial banks
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(Bank of Botswana, 2000: 60~61). The NDB disbursed P98 million in agricultural loans,
mostly to livestock farmers (Bank of Botswana, 2000:51).
4.3.2 Past Investment in Fixed Improvement to Land (I)
Table 4.2 presents results for equation 4.2 explaining past investment in fixed
improvement to land. The regression coefficient estimated for LIQUIDITY 1 is positive and
significant. Investment in fixed improvements is higher amongst respondents who get
more off-farm wage income.
Credit used to finance fixed improvements (Cd is positively correlated with TENURE (r =
0.719) and it was not possible to estimate the separate contributions of these variables to
investment in fixed improvements. Again Principal Component Analysis was used to
construct an index of the correlated variables.
Table 4.2: OLS regression results for investment in fixed improvements (LN(l))
Dependent variable: Natural Logarithm of one plus present value of investment in
boreholes measured in Pula (LN (l)
Coefficient Beta t-value
Intercept 4.81 1.92 *
AGE 0.003 0.00 0.01
GENDER 0.12 0.01 0.06
MARRIED 1.65 0.11 1.02
FAMILY -0.27 -0.12 -l.ll
EDUCATION 0.16 0.10 0.75
LIQUIDITY j 0.00047 0.21 2.03 **










significant at one percent level of probability.
significant at five per cent level of probability.
significant at ten percent level of probability.
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The first principal component was estimated as;
PC I = 0.765 (standardized Cd + 0.765 (standardized tenure)
with an eigen value of 1.2. This index accounted for 59 percent of the variation in CL and
TENURE and was included in equation 4.2 as a positive measure of these variables. The
regression coefficient estimated for this index is positive, highly significant and carries the
largest beta value. Since TENURE is predetermined and not influenced by the amount of
credit used to finance fixed improvements, it could again be viewed as the underlying
determinant of such investment followed by CL, and the independent determinants
LIQUIDITY\, FAMILY, and MARRIED - all of which have absolute t-values greater than
unity.
FAMILY has a negative coefficient suggesting that there is indeed a trade-off between
consumption and investment. Respondents with private farms use more long-term credit to
finance fixed improvements and invest more in these improvements than do communal
farmers who rely on open access grazing land-especially if they get more off-farm wage
income, are MARRIED and have smaller families.
4.3.3 Current Investment in Operating Inputs Per Livestock Unit (i)
In equation 4.3 the regression coefficient estimated for LIQUIDITY2 is positive and
statistically significant. This is consistent with the arguments made in sub section 2.2.3 .
Contrary to some arguments, the results in Table 4.3 .indicate that older, married, male
respondents are less inclined to invest in operating inputs.
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Table 4.3: 2SLS regression results for investment in operating inputs per livestock
(LN (I)
Dependent variable: Natural Logarithm of one plus expenditure on current
operating inputs per livestock unit measured in Pula (LN(I)
Coefficient Beta t-value
Intercept 4.50 5.29 ***
AGE -0.390 -0.27 -2.02 **
GENDER -0.930 -0.15 -1.25
MARRIED -0.790 -0.18 -1.29
FAMILY 0.00 0.001 0.008
EDUCATION 0.050 0.09 0.62
LIQUIDITYz 0.000060 0.40 2.91 ***









significantat one percent level of probability.
significantat five per cent level of probability.
significantat ten percent level of probability.
According to its beta value, LIQUIDITYz (from short-term credit and off-farm wage
income) is the most important, and the only positive, direct determinant of expenditure on
operating inputs per livestock unit.
4.3.4 Herd Productivity (h)
In equation 4.4 the regression coefficient for the present value of investments in fixed
improvement plus current expenditure on operating inputs per livestock unit is positive and
highly significant with a t-value greater than unity (Table 4.4). The result is consistent with
the arguments and postulations made in sub section 2.2.3.
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Table 4.4: 2SLS regression results for herd productivity (h)























significant at one percent level of probability.
significant at five per cent level of probability.
significant at ten percent level of probability.
Secure land tenure has an indirect effect on herd productivity through its direct impact on
agricultural credit and fixed improvements. The Ministry of Agriculture (1991) and
Behnke (1987) also found that farmers who owned boreholes and who purchased
supplementary feed had higher calving rates than those who did not.
CHAPTERS
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MAJOR FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1 MAJOR FINDINGS
This study uses the descriptive statistics and a recursive block regression model to identify
factors that explain productivity differences of cattle managed by farmers in southern
Botswana. Results of the regression analysis suggest that secure land tenure is a
fundamental determinant of agricultural credit use. Respondents with private farms and
larger herds are both willing and able to access more agricultural credit than those who rely
on open access communal grazing to raise cattle. Secure tenure is also a fundamental
determinant of investment in fixed improvements. Respondents with private farms and
higher levels of long-term credit and liquidity from off-farm wage remittances tend to
invest more in fixed improvements than do communal farmers who rely on open access
grazing land-especially if they are married and have smaller families. Liquidity from
short-term credit and wage remittances is the most important direct determinant of
expenditure on operating inputs. Herd productivity, in turn, increases with greater
investment in operating inputs and fixed improvements, and is therefore positively (but
indirectly) influenced by secure land tenure.
5.2 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
From the regression results it could be inferred that government should (a) uphold private
property rights to land where they already exist; (b) privatise open access grazing to
individual owner-operators where this is politically, socially and economically feasible;
and (c ) where privatization to individuals is not feasible, government should encourage
users to convert open access grazing into common property by subsidising the costs of
defining user groups and the boundaries of their resources, and of negotiating and
enforcing rules limiting individual use of the common property. This would help to arrest
over-exploitation of the grazing resource but is unlikely to promote investment in fixed
improvements in all but the smallest of user groups. Penalties applied to members who
.,
break the rules limiting individual use of the common property must be consistent with
national law. The government, through the Attorney General Chambers, should draft
guidelines for user groups to consider in the design and enforcement of their rules. This
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first-step in a gradual shift towards more secure tenure should be followed by conversion
of user groups to non-user groups organised along the lines of investor-owned firms where
members exchange use rights for benefit and voting rights in a joint venture managed by
an expert.
In the case of a non user-group, members surrender their use rights to a management team
in exchange for other property rights such as voting and benefit rights. The management
team is given power to make decisions without interference from users. Non-user group
arrangements can create strong incentives for members to invest in a joint enterprise if the
institutional arrangements eliminate free and forced-rider problems in collective action.
This requires a non-user group to be operated as (or like) a private company with well-
defined and fully tradable benefit and voting rights (i.e. shares) that are proportional to the
investment made by each shareholder. The initial investment could be financed by
exchanging cattle for equity capital (Le. shares) in the company.
Good corporate governance should be entrenched through accountability. For the
Directors, accountability is facilitated by reporting minutes of Board meetings and
independently audited financial statements, and through sound electoral process and
marketable shares. The government should also empower share holders with basic literacy
skills to be able to interpret financial statements correctly and to participate effectively in
general meetings.
5.3 SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In this study, the empirical model identified determinants of herd productivity in
Botswana. Policy recommendations (Le. privatising open access grazing to individual
owner operators and converting user groups into non-user groups) have been suggested to
improve herd productivity in Botswana. Further research should be undertaken to compare
the productivity between individual owner operator farms and non-user groups organised
along the lines of investor owned firms. This study would also apply the New Institutional
Economics (NIE) theory to assist in identifying institutional and organisational factors that
would constrain the success of a non-user group organised along the lines of investor
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owned firm. The NIE would shed more light on, for example, the best type of governance
institutions to promote the efficient use of eo-owned resources. This study will provide
more information to make shared enterprises work better and improve their efficiency.
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SUMMARY
This study compares socio-economic, productivity and investment indicators and identifies
factors thought to explain differences in the productivity of cattle managed by farmers in
southern Botswana. The study was prompted by claims of poor herd performance,
especially in herds on communal grazing land in Botswana. The livestock sector in
Botswana is characterised by two distinct systems of land tenure, namely; communal
grazing-an open access resource that accounts for 86 percent of the cattle and 71 percent of
farmers in Botswana. Private grazing is characterised by secure land rights and accounts
for 14 percent of the national cattle herd and five percent ofthe land area.
An open access resource means that users have unrestricted use of the resource. High
stocking rates in the communal areas have been linked to high soil erosion, land
degradation and a general decline in the national herd because Land Boards do not enforce
maximum stocking rates in communal areas. In addition, water rights assigned to farmers
in communal areas do not impose any restrictions on the volume of water used or the
number ofanimals kept by stockowners.
The study is important because livestock make a significant contribution to the livelihood
of farmers in Botswana. Livestock, especially cattle, are a major source of meat and milk,
and provide a store of wealth. As producer goods, cattle supply draught power. Cattle offer
a hedge against inflation and can be readily converted into cash in times of need. Beef
exports account for most of the foreign exchange earned by agriculture because crop
farming is severely constrained by erratic and unreliable rainfall. Cattle account for about
three percent of Botswana's gross domestic product (GDP) and for most of agriculture 's
share of GDP. Moreover, ranching is an important source of employment in rural
Botswana where the majority of households live in communal areas and depend largely on
cattle as a source of income.
There is a strong view that the productivity of the livestock sector in Botswana is primarily
influenced by land tenure status. Economic theory suggests that land tenure institutions
influence decisions about stocking rates and investments in improvements and operating
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inputs. There is no incentive for a communal farmer to reduce the size of his own herd, or
to finance fixed improvements (such as boreholes to water livestock), on open access
grazing land because the benefits would accrue largely to free-riders. Under-investment in
fixed improvements leads to under-investment in operating inputs and allocative
inefficiency. This problem arises because there is no market for open access land owing to
prohibitively high transaction costs. By contrast, the market for privately-owned farmland
creates an opportunity cost for under-utilised land that encourages the owner to sell or rent
the land out to more effective farmers. Private farmers whose land tenure is secure (in the
economic sense of possessing fully exclusive and transferable property rights) have a
stronger incentive to invest in fixed improvements as they have a much higher probability
of internalizing the benefits of their investment. In Botswana, these farmers also find it
easier to finance improvement because there is a market for privately owned land. Banks
do not accept land as collateral for loans unless it has a market value. An active land
market strengthens incentives to improve land because capital gains can be realized at any
time by selling or leasing out. Improvements to land and livestock tend to raise the
productivity of operating inputs, encouraging more intensive use of supplementary feed
and medications that prevent disease and injury.
For these reasons, it is postulated that herd productivity and investment indicators in
southern Botswana will be higher on private ranches than on (open access) communal
grazing land. This hypothesis is consistent with the 1991 policy objective of converting
open access grazing into common and private property and with the view that common
property user-groups should be converted into non-user groups resembling company
operations. In this case, members of the group surrender their use rights for benefit rights
by exchanging livestock for equity (shares) in the operating entity, they hire or elect
experts to manage the farm, and share profits in proportion to their own equity
contributions.
To test the hypothesis, this study develops and estimates a block-recursive regression
model of the relationships anticipated between secure land tenure, agricultural credit,
investment in fixed improvements to land, investment in operating inputs, herd
productivity and relevant household and farmer characteristics.
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Data used in this study were gathered in a stratified random sample of 96 livestock owners
in the southern region of Botswana during 1999/2000. The southern is representative of
most other cattle-farming regions in terms of terrain, rainfall patterns and population
characteristics. Rainfall is typically low, averaging about 550mm per annum. The study
comprised of two strata, one for communal farmers and the other for private farmers to
ensure variation in land tenure arrangements. Households with cattle were identified and
listed and a random sample was drawn from each list. A total of 65 (black) communal
farmers and 31 (30 black and one white) private farmers were interviewed using a pre-
tested and structured questionnaire. Land tenure status was measured as a dummy variable
scoring one for private farmers and zero for communal farmers.
Independent, t-tests were calculated to check for significant differences between group
means for private and communal farmers. Zero-order correlation coefficients were also
computed to assess the degree of linear association between pairs of variables relevant to
the study. Variables that were strongly correlated were subjected to Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) to reduce multicollinearity between explanatory variables that were
included in the block-recursive regression model. The model was estimated using OLS and
2SLS regression techniques.
The regression model was postulated as follows:
(a) e = f'(X", T, H)
(b) I <f (X", T,Cd
(e) i = f(X a, c, l)
(d) h = f (I, i)
Equation (a) argues that the present value of (long plus short) agricultural credit is
positively influenced by secure land tenure (private ownership), higher liquidity and a
larger herd size (wealth). Positive relationships are expected because farmers with greater
wealth and liquidity are more creditworthy as they have more collateral and better
repayment ability. Private ownership of land not only strengthens the incentive to invest
but also adds to the owner's stock of wealth and collateral. The household and farmer
characteristics include family size, off-farm income, marital status and the farmer's age,
education and gender (a dummy variable scoring one for male farmers and zero for
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females). Off-farm wage income is a relatively important and reliable source of liquidity
for many rural households and is therefore expected to impact positively on access to
credit owing to better debt-servicing ability. Age could also carry a positive sign as it
measures accumulated farming experience and social standing. A high social standing can
reduce transaction costs. On the other hand, age could carry a negative sign as older
farmers may be more risk averse and less inclined to innovate than younger farmers.
Education is expected to impact positively on the use of credit because it reduces
transaction costs in formal markets and enhances allocative efficiency, so improving a
farmer's creditworthiness. Gender may also influence transaction costs and
creditworthiness. In Botswana, women married in community of property (including
women married under customary law) cannot borrow without legal consent from their
husbands.
Equation (b) postulates that investment in fixed improvements is positively influenced by
private ownership and better access to long-term credit. Secure land tenure strengthens the
farmer's incentive to invest. Few improvements are expected where land tenure is insecure
as future returns are discounted at a high rate owing to uncertainty. In this case, uncertainty
stems largely from future returns lost to other stockowners (free-riders) who share
inclusive rights to communal grazing. Access to long-term credit improves a farmer's
ability to finance fixed improvements. Positive collinearity between secure tenure and the
present value of long-term credit is likely in view of the arguments presented in chapter 2.
Household and farmer characteristics are included largely as control variables although
education is expected to carry a positive sign as it serves as a proxy for permanent income
and family size is expected to carry a negative sign owing to a trade-off between
consumption and investment. Age on the other hand is expected to carry a positive sign as
it proxies experience and exposure to investment opportunities.
Equation (c) states that current investment in operating inputs per livestock unit is
positively influenced by private ownership and better access to short-term credit. Again,
the ability to finance operating inputs is expected to improve with better access to short-
term credit, while investment in fixed improvements is expected to increase the
productivity of these inputs so strengthening the incentive to purchase them. Household
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and farmer characteristics are included largely as control variables with expected signs
similar to those postulated for equation (b).
Equation (d) expresses herd productivity as a positive function of past investment in fixed
improvements and current investment in operating inputs per livestock unit. A study of
cattle off-take rates in Botswana supports the argument that investment in fixed
improvements (like boreholes and fences) and operating inputs (such as feed supplements
and vaccines) will increase herd productivity. Investment in boreholes, supplementary feed
and vaccines is expected to reduce mortality rates and improve calving and off-take rates.
Positive collinearity between investment in fixed improvements and expenditure on
operating inputs per livestock unit is likely following the logic of equation (c).
The major findings for this study indicate that:
1. Respondents with private farms and larger herds are both willing and able to access
more agricultural credit.
2. Respondents with private farms, more long-term credit and liquidity from wage
remittances invest more in fixed improvements than do communal farmers who rely
on open access grazing land- especially if they are married and have smaller
families.
3. Farmers, especially younger males are more inclined to invest in operating inputs if
they are liquid.
4. Herd productivity increases with greater investment in operating inputs and fixed
improvements and is therefore positively (but indirectly) influenced by secure land
tenure.
It can be concluded that government should (a) uphold private property rights to land
where they already exist; (b) privatise open access grazing to individual owner-operators
where it is politically, socially and economically feasible; (c) where privatisation to
individuals is not feasible, government should encourage users to convert the grazing into
common property by subsidizing the costs of defining user groups and the boundaries of
their resources, and of enforcing rules limiting individual use of common property. This
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first step in a gradual shift towards more secure tenure should be followed by the
conversion of user groups to non-user groups organised along the lines of investor-owned
firms where members exchange use rights for tradable benefit and voting rights that are
proportional to the investment made by each shareholder. The initial investment could be
financed by exchanging cattle for equity capital (shares) in the company.
Good corporate governance should be entrenched through accountability. For Directors,
accountability is facilitated by reporting minutes in a Board meeting and independently
audited financial statements, and through sound electoral process and marketable shares.
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COMMERCIALISATION OF THE TRADITIONAL CATTLE




My name is I am working for the Botswana College of
Agriculture. I would like to ask you a few questions about the productivity of cattle and
some of the problems you face in keeping your cattle. The information I collect will assist
government in planning and properly targeting any future subsidies for the livestock sector.
Anything you tell me will be confidential and the report will not have names but will
summarise your views together with other farmers we will interview.
I thank you for your time.
DATE OF INTERVIEW .
1. Interviewer's name .
2. Respondent Number .. " .
3. Name of village .
4. Name of household head .
5. District .
6. Region .
Farm type: A. FREEHOLD: .
1. Owner Operator '"
2. Leasehold .
B.COMMUNAL .
3. Common Property (syndicate) .
4. Open access .
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7. Do the household own or manage any cattle including mafisa (cattle that are
being cared for by someone else).
Yes No
Respondent's herd size group .
If yes, continue with questionnaire





A 1.11 HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHY
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Serial Name Age Gend er Marital Relation Occupation Wag e per Years of Residential Location of Years of
No. Stat us month Schooling Statu s employment farm ing
1.114 1.115 1.116














1. Less than 30 2. 31-40
3. 41-50 4. 51-60
5. 61-70 6. More than 70
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(2) Gender
1. Male 2. Female
(3) Marital Status
1. Single 2. Married
3. Widowed 4. SeparatedlDivorced
(4) Relationship to Household Head
1. Household Head 2. Spouse ofhead
3. Child ofhead/spouse 4. Parent of head/spouse
5. Sibling of head/spouse 6. Spouse of child ofhead/spouse
7. Grandchild of head/spouse 8. Full-time hired worker
9. Other person not related to
head/spouse
(5) Occupation - employment
1. Farmer 2. Housewife
3. Student 4. Domestic worker (include housekeeping
5. Local shop owner or and gardening
business owner 6. Shop/business employee
7. Migrant worker - mines 8. Migrant worker - farms
9. Government employee 10. Herd boy/Shepard
11. Unemployed 12. Child
(6) Wage per month
(7) Years of schooling
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1. None 2. Two
3. Four 4. Six
5. Eight 6. Ten
7. Twelve 8. Fourteen
9. Sixteen 10. Eighteen
11. Twenty 12. Twenty-two
(8) Residential satus
1. Resident 2. Absent, outside Botswana - work
3. Absent, in Botswana - work 4. Absent, in Botswana - school
(9) Location of employment
1. Botswana, Town 2. Botswana, District
3. Other - specify
(10) Years of training
1. None 2. 5 years
3. 6-10 years 4. More than 10 years
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noc z
B1.12 SOURCES OF HOUSEHOLD CASH INCOME
(Except cattle, and their products)
Average Monthly Cash Income received after last visit (Pula)
TYPES OF WORKlINCOME SOURCE AMOUNT (PULA)
Work of men elsewhere .
Work of women elsewhere , , .
Work ofmen within Botswana .
Work ofwomen within Botswana .
Sale ofchicken, eggs, pigs or pork .
Sale ofBojalwa or beer. , .
Sale ofproduce from fields .
Sale ofvegetables .
Rental of house or room .
Profit from shop/taxi .
Sales ofHH produced handicrafts .
Sale ofother things, Specify .
Gifts or help from relatives .
Payment ofbuilding, thatching, etc .
Other cash resources, specify .






.. . ... . . . .. . .. . .... ........ ..... . .. . ... .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . ... .. .. . . .. ..... . . .. . ... .. . .... . . ...
DOC3
C AGRICULTURAL ASSETS
1.14 Total farm land (in ha)
Type ofownership : A. PRIVATE: _
I. Owner operator__
2. Leasehold -----




4. Open access _
Animal Drawn Tractor drawn
---_._.._---'.--- _.~. ..- _.- - --- , --- .__.~.- ->--- '-- ._... ---~--- _._._.__._--_..- --- - - - _._~- ...--
Year of Year of
















D LIVESTOCK INVENTORY CODE OF VILLAGE _
2.0 Of animals that you own, please provide the following information about each species








2.10 If the cattle you keep belong to somebody else (mafsa -out) or if your cattle are kept and
taken care of bv someone (mafias- in) fill the following table















Gain access to grazing
Gain access to better management
Gain access to herding
Gain access to cattle post
78
Does
DATE OF RECORDING _
E 2.20 BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTION
(Monthly recordings)
HOUSEHOLD NUMBER _

































2.21 Does the land ownership in your farm contribute to the number of calves born (calving
rate)
I Yes _ No _








F LIVESTOCK SALES, SLAUGHETER AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS
2.30 Did you sell any cattle after the last visit?
1 Yes 2 No _














1 Where did you sell
1 Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) _
2 Cooperatives (Coops)
3 Local Butcher
4 Other - specify
2 Why did you sell your cattle
1 Pay school fees
2 Buy food & clothes
3 Meet funeral expenses
4 Pay livestock expenses
5 Pay lobola (dowry)
6 Other - specify
2.32 How many cattle did you purchase after the last visit __ (number)


















2.34 Did you exchange any cattle
1 Yes 2 No ----








Month Number Value ula
82
Doe 7
G DISPOSAL OF PRODUCTS FROM SLAUGHTERED ANIMALS
2.40 Did you slaughter any cattle after the last visit
Yes ---- No _
2.41 What was the reason for the slaughter
1 Home consumption 4 Welcome baby
2 Funeral 5 Wedding
3 Sale ofmeat 6 Ancestral offering
2.42 How many cattle were slaughtered
2.43 If you slaughtered any cattle, how did you dispose of the hide, for how much
p------
1 I sold to the village _
2 Sold to the private trader _
3 Kept for bedding _
4 Other _
2.44 What type ofcuring did you use for the hide
1 sun dried ------
2 shade dried -----
3 dry salted _
H MILK PRODUCTION
4 not cured your cows----
5 your cows after calving ---
(days)
2.50 How many cows do you milk per time 2.51 How much milk do you get from each
_____ (number)
2.52 How long do you milk your cows
__ (months)
cow (Litres)
2.53 When do you start milking
2.54 Do you sell your milk
1 Yes 2 No _
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2.55 Where do you sell your milk
1 Local shop __ 2 Village __
3 Cooperative _
2.56 What are the constraints in selling 2.57 What quantity of milk do your





2.58 How do you use milk
1 Drink fresh _
2 Eat madila ---------
3 Use for tea ---------
4 Use as relish --------
Doe 8
I DRAUGHT POWER OF CATTLE
2.60 Did you use cattle for draught power
1 Yes 2 No _
2.61 If yes for what activity
1 Ploughing 2 Planting
3 Weeding 4 Transporting __
5 Others
2.62 How many days did you use the draught power _
2.63 Did you hire out any cattle for draught power
84
I Yes _ 2 No _
2.64 If yes what activity were you hiring out for:
1 Ploughing __ 2 Planting _
4 Transportation _
2.65 How long did you hire out cattle for this activity
1 12 hours 2 One day _
4 Three days __ 5 Four days _
3 Threshing _
3 Two days _
6 More than 5 days __
2.66 How much were you paid for such an activity (P) _
2.67 Does the condition ofdraft animals ever delay agricultural operations
1 Yes _ 2 No -----
2.68 Is the lack of draft animals hinder agricultural production
Yes ----- 2 No _
J MANURE AND ITS UTILISATION
2.70 Do you use cattle manure in your farm
1 Yes 2 No _
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2.71 If yes what do you use the manure for
1 Fertilizer 2 Building _
4 Fuel 5 Lining ofbaskets _
3 Decoration (floors)_
6 Others----
2.72 How much was collected (kg/bags) _
2.73 How much was used in the farm-------------
2.74 How much was sold (kg/bags) _
2.75 What was the value of the manure used (P)---------
86
DOC9
K LIVESTOCK HUSBANDRY PRACTICES
2.80 How often do you water your cattle?
1 everyday _
2 every other day _
3 other, specify _
2.81 What kind ofwatering points do you use most ofthe time?
1 own borehole 2 private borehole _
3 council borehole 4 syndicate borehole _
5 dam 6 sand river well ----
2.82 How many people water their cattle in this water source (number)
2.83 Who is the owner of the water source-----------
2.84 Do you pay any watering fees
Yes ------- 2 No -------
2.85 At what time of the day do you water your cattle
1 4.00 am to 8.00 am 2 8.00 am to 12.00 noon ---
3 12.00 noon to 2.00 pm _
2.86 Do you get enough water for your cattle during the season
1 Yes 2 No
-------
2.87 Do you get enough grass for your cattle during the season
Yes 2 No
-------







2.89 Do you treat your cattle for ticks
1 Yes-------






2.91 During the last 12 months, which diseases have your cattle been vaccinated against?
I Botulism - mokokomalo 2 Foot and mouth - tlhako le molomo
3 Black quarter (heartwater)- 4 Contagious abortion - pholotso
Serotswana
5 Anthrax - Kwatsi 6 Other
2.92 Do you castrate calves for yourself?
1 Yes 2 No
2.93 At what age?
2.94 Do you dehorn your cattle?
Yes 2 No
2.95 Do you use artificial insemination?
1 Yes 2 No
Ifno, why
DOCIO
L LAND MANAGEMENT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
3.10 What grazing rights do you have on the land you are occupying?
o Open access 1 Private access
3.11 Who assigns land tenure rights in this area?
1 Land Board
2 ChieflHeadman
3 Village Development Committee
3.12 Do you have restrictions on who can graze his/her cattle in the area?
1 Yes 2 No -------
3.13 Can you transfer your land rights to anybody of your choice?
1 Yes 2 No
-------
3.14 Do you have rights to sell this land in your area?
1 Yes 2 No
-------
3.15 Do you pay fees for grazing in the area
1 Yes 2 No
-------
3.16 How many years is the lease you have on the land
..............................................................................................
3.17 Are the rights you have to land exclusive or inclusive
............. ............... ............................ ....................................
88
89
3.18 How are land rights distributed within households under this tenure system
3.19 Are the current levels of tenure security system constraining agricultural investments




3.20 Has land title registration contributed to an inequitable distribution of land resources
1 Yes 2 No _
3.21 Has land registration increased or decreased security of land tenure
1 Yes 2 No _
3.22 Who determines the number ofcattle to be kept (stocking rate)
1 Agricultural Officer 2 Land Board-Officer
-------
3 District Commissioner 4 Other
------------






3.24 How many hours/days does this person spend in enforcing the rules
3.25 Have offenders ever been detected and prosecuted
1 Yes 2 No _
3.26 What are the penalties for breaking the rules of property ownership
3.27 Who enforces the penalties
3.28 What is your view on fencing communal land
1 Agree with it 2 Do not agree with it .
3 Desirable but has some 4 I can't comment at the moment .
constraints .
3.29 What is your view on individual property ownership of grazing areas
1 Agree with it 2 Do not agree with it .




M LIVESTOCK LABOUR REQUIREMENTS
Date recorded .
Name of recorder .






















Cash In kind Payment
1) Herder Relationship Codes
1 Child of household/spouse
2 Sibling ofhead/spouse
3 Household Head
4 Other relationship head/spouse
5 No relation to head





























2) Herder Relationship Codes
1 Child of household/spouse
2 Sibling of head/spouse
3 Household Head
4 Other relationship of head/spouse


































3.34 Are there any problems employing herdsmen?
1 Yes 2 No -------
3.35 What are the problems?
Marketing costs
3.36 How far is the place you are marketing your cattle?
.................................... . ....................................... .......................
3.37 Do you have access to a phone?
1 Yes------- 2 No _
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3.38 How do you contact them that you will be selling cattle?
1 Phone........ ... 2 Travel there......... 3 Write .
3.39 If yes how much do you pay to telephone buyers ofyour cattle?
3.40 How much do you pay to transport your cattle to the market?
3.41 What other costs do you incur in marketing your cattle?
.. .. . .. .. ..... ... ... ...... ........ ........ . ..... ........ ... .. . .. . ... ....... . .... ..... ... . .. . ...
DOC13
N FODDER AND SUPPLEMENTAL FEEDS
3.50 Are your cattle fed any supplementary feeds?
95
I Yes _ 2 No _
3.51 What type of supplementary feed do you use?
Supplement Month Quantity Price per Government Total





Bone meal & salts
Bran
Other
Total nla nla nla nla
3.52 How frequent do you feed the above supplement
I everyday. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . 2 once a week .
3 once a month 4 other specify .
o DRUGS AND VACCINES (USED AFTER LAST VISIT)
3.60 Were any medicines given to any ofthe stock?
96
1 Yes _ 2 No _
3.61 If yes, obtain the following informat ion:
Condition treated Month Medicines No of animals Cost of Total














3.70 Which ofthe expenses did you incur after the last visit?
3.71





Kraal making and repairs
Rent fees
3.72 In the last year, which ofthe following expenses did your household incur, and how










3.80 Below your sources of credit for your operation
98




4.0 Below your sources of credit for your operation
Factor Rank
1. Inadequate funds to produce animals
2. Inadequate funds to purchase other input
3. Family labour
4. Local herding labour
5. Expense ofherding labour
. .... ......... ....... ................ ........
..... ..... ..... .. .. ... .. .... ............. .. ..
... ..... ....... ... .. .... .... . ................
.. .. .. . . ... .. .. . . .. .. . . .. . .... .. . . . . . .. . .
6. Management
7. Availability of winter fodder
8. Expense ofwinter fodder
9. Winter grazing around village
10. Winter cattle post grazing
11. Summer grazing around village
12. Summer cattle post graz ing
13. Overstocking
14. Drought
4.1 Was any assistance received from:
. . ... ... .. .. . ... . .. . .. . ... . . . .. .. .. .. . . .
. .... .. . .. ........... ....... ...........
... .... . .. .... .. . ............ ... ... .. ..
. . .... . . .. . .. . .... . . .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . ... .
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Livestock spec ialists of Min istry of Agriculture
Veterinary assistants of Ministry of Agriculure
Project Personnel ofMoA



































Notes on the document
to be filled at the start and at the end of study
to be filled at the start and at the end of study
to be filled at the start and at the end of study
to be filled once at the start and every month




recording once at the beginning and once at the end
recording once at the beginning and once at the end
recording once at the beginning and every month
recording once at the beginning and every month
recording once at the beginning and once at the end
recording once at the beginning and every month
recording once at the beginning and once at the end
